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The commercialisation of equity
Man Yip and James Lee*
Singapore Management University and King’s College London
This paper analyses the jurisprudence on the relevance of the commercial context to
principles of the law of equity and trusts. We criticise recent UK Supreme Court decisions
in the area (chieﬂy Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, FHR European Ventures v Cedar
Capital Partners and AIB Group v Mark Redler & Co) and identify a trend of the
‘commercialisation’ of the issues. The cases are placed in comparative context and it is
argued that there is an unsatisfactory pattern of judicial reasoning, exhibiting a preference
for some degree of unarticulated ﬂexibility in commercial adjudication. But the price of that
ﬂexibility is a lack of doctrinal coherence and the development of equitable principles that
will apply in, and beyond, the commercial context. We also argue that this trend has
important implications for the coming rounds of Supreme Court appointments.
Man Yip, Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, 55 Armenian Street, Singapore
179943 and DS Lee Foundation Fellow. Email: manyip@smu.edu.sg. James Lee, Senior Lecturer in
Private Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK
and Associate Academic Fellow of the Inner Temple. Email: james.lee@kcl.ac.uk
‘The question when it is right to invoke an equitable right in a commercial context
is not always easy to resolve.’1
INTRODUCTION
In 1516, St Thomas More’s Utopia was published, with Holdsworth noting that at the
time of its writing:
New countries, new nations, new phenomena of all kinds were emerging. With these
things the old learning, the old modes of thought and reasoning were powerless to
deal. These things must be investigated; and the results of that investigation
necessarily led to the abandonment of old theories.2
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the Eighth Biennial Conference on the Law
of Obligations at the University of Cambridge in July 2016. We are grateful to those who
attended, and especially Elise Bant, Michael Bryan, Robert Chambers, Tatiana Cutts, Jamie
Glister, Lusina Ho, Rebecca Lee, Charles Mitchell, Andrew Robertson, Graham Virgo and
Sarah Worthington, for helpful comments, All views, and any errors, are our own.
1. Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat v Akai Holdings [2010] HKCU 2362 at [145] (Lord
Neuberger NPJ).
2. WS Holdsworth Some Makers of English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1938) p 72.
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More would go on to become the ﬁrst common lawyer to reach the ofﬁce of Lord
Chancellor:3 Scott remarked that equity ‘did not begin to assume the shape of law
until More became Chancellor’, and that it took ‘a great stride forward during his
administration’.4
Five hundred years after Utopia, Lord Neuberger has noted that ‘equity is alive
in the UK Supreme Court’.5 Here, we consider the extent to which ‘old modes of
thought’ in equity are being challenged by perceived commercial phenomena. The
perspectives of current Justices of the Court – especially those who were not
Chancery lawyers – are informing a reinterpretation of equitable principles and,
in some instances, their application in different contexts. In 2014, the Supreme
Court handed down three landmark judgments – Williams v Central Bank of
Nigeria,6 FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners7 and AIB Group v
Mark Redler & Co8 – that resolved some of the most difﬁcult debates in equity.
All three disputes arose in the commercial context. In AIB, the Supreme Court
restated the law of equitable compensation for breach of trust as being concerned
only with making good losses suffered but for the breach, thereby aligning
equitable compensation with damages at law. In FHR, the Supreme Court opted
for the ‘simple’ answer, based mainly on policy considerations, that all
unauthorised proﬁts received by ﬁduciaries are held on constructive trust for the
principal. In Williams, the Supreme Court sharply distinguished between strangers
to a trust and trustees for limitations purposes, with little regard for the arguable
doctrinal similarities between knowing recipients and express trustees and even
less regard for sensible statutory interpretation.
The judicial reasoning in each case, as this paper will show, is underlined by
commercial pragmatism of simplifying legal standards for commercial actors, as
well as wider commercial concerns. Lord Neuberger commented in Patel v Mirza
that ‘the ultimate function of the courts in common law and equity is to formulate
and develop rules of a clear and practical nature’.9 However, the ‘commercialisation’
of equity at the highest level – whether by way of context-based application or
3. Lawton J in Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443 at 459. Professor Holdsworth recorded that
‘Cardinal Wolsey was the last of the ecclesiastical Chancellors of the medieval type. He was
replaced in 1529 by Sir Thomas More – an eminent common lawyer and the son of a common
law judge’: WS Holdsworth ‘The inﬂuence of Roman law on English equity’ in Essays in Law
and History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946) pp 193–194.
4. AW Scott, Trusts §1.1. See also G Glen ‘St Thomas More as judge and lawyer’ (1941) 10
Fordham L Rev 187 at 193: ‘in the great idea of equity to which he turned his energies, St.
Thomas More was quite modern, just as he was in all other things’. On the other hand, Hanbury
does not mention More at all in his ‘Historical sketch of equity’, offered as ch 1 of the ﬁrst edition
of Modern Equity (London: Stevens & Sons, 1935).
5. Lord Neuberger ‘Equity – the soul and spirit of all law or a roguish thing?’ Lehane Lecture
2014, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Sydney, 4 August 2014; available at https://www.
supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140804.pdf (accessed 28 September 2016).
6. [2014] AC 1189.
7. [2014] UKSC 45.
8. [2014] UKSC 58.
9. [2016] 3 WLR 399 at [170].
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commercially driven reinterpretation10 of what are the fundamental principles –
often takes place discreetly under the cloak of context-neutrality. Such a tacit yet
paradigmatic shift risks undervaluing the importance of equitable doctrine and
bypassing the need for transparent reasoning.11
Further, as with More’s inﬂuence on the Chancery as an institution, we argue that an
appreciation of the views of particular Justices in the Supreme Court as to equity is
crucial to an understanding of the development of the law, and the normative choices
involved. This paper therefore offers a critical analysis of contemporary developments
of equity not only by reference to principle, but also by considering the inﬂuence of the
particular judges and the methods employed. Presently, the place of equity in commerce
is not at risk; if anything, it is the core of the equitable principles that are in jeopardy.
1. JUDGES, COMMERCE AND EQUITY
Holdsworth had high praise for More, whose ‘beautiful character would have made him
an ideal Chancellor at any time’.12 Similarly, Holdsworth viewed the appointment of
More as ‘an important turning-point in the history of equity’,13 because More
rationalised and brought coherence to the operation of the relevant principles, and
restored ‘harmonious relations between the court of Chancery and the common law
courts for the next half a century’.14 More’s Chancellorship was thus transformative.
The assessment of Supreme Court decisions below highlights the inﬂuence of certain
Justices on the recent developments. Notable contributors appear to be Lord Neuberger
PSC (a Chancery judge), Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Mance JSC (commercial
lawyers by background). There is no requirement that the Supreme Court should have
a particular complement of Chancery lawyers, with the only statutory requirement that
‘between them the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law
of each part of the United Kingdom’.15 The last round of appointments was in 2013,
when Lords Hughes, Toulson and Hodge JJSC were appointed. Lord Toulson replaced
10. There is an imperfect parallel with the contractual interpretation cases. See Arnold v Britton
[2015] UKSC 36 at [17], where Lord Neuberger PSC cautioned that ‘the reliance placed in some
cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances… should not be invoked to
undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed’; ZX Tan
‘Beyond the real and the paper deal: the quest for contextual coherence in contractual
interpretation’ (2016) 79 Mod L Rev 623 and D McLauchlan ‘A better way of making sense
of contracts?’ (2016) 132 L Q Rev 577. See further Lord Neuberger in Marley v Rawlings
[2014] UKSC 2; [2015] AC 129 at [20], applying the same principles to a will. The emphasis
on commercial context in considering the certainty of intention to create a trust was recently
considered by the High Court of Australia in Korda v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Limited
[2015] HCA 6 (especially per Keane J at [230]–[237]). See also a case on interpretation of trust
deeds in a commercial context (albeit one which Lord Sumption in dissent at [55] described as
being ‘of considerable ﬁnancial importance to the parties but rais[ing] no questions of wider legal
signiﬁcance’): BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 1 Plc [2016]
UKSC 29.
11. See further Sir A Mason ‘The place of equity and equitable remedies in the contemporary
common law world’ (1994) 110 L Q Rev 238 and Lord Millett ‘Equity’s place in the law of
commerce’ (1998) 114 L Q Rev 214.
12. Holdsworth, above n 2, pp 98–99.
13. Ibid, p 98.
14. Ibid, p 99.
15. Constitutional Reform Act, s 27(8).
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the retiring Lord Walker,16 which has since left the Court ‘looking a bit threadbare on
the chancery side’.17 Lord Neuberger is the only Chancery specialist currently serving
on the Court, albeit that Lord Carnwath served in the Chancery Division when in the
High Court, but as his Lordship has conceded, his practice at the Bar had principally
been in planning and local government law.18 In addition, Lord Collins has, since his
retirement, occasionally returned as an ad hoc judge to assist in such cases.19 As we
shall see below in section 3, even Lord Neuberger has changed his mind on key issues,
As his Lordship has said (speaking of himself in the third person, as he did in FHR):
‘Lord Neuberger is not on his own when it comes to judicial tergiversations on the issue
of a principal’s proprietary interests in his agent’s bribe. His volte-face is by no means
an exception in what is seen by some as the placid waters of equity.’20.
We argue that this overall lack of specialist Chancery expertise has seen the
Supreme Court’s equity jurisprudence take a more commercial turn. The days are
past when commercial lawyers might fear their cases in the highest cases being
decided by a ‘Chancery lawyer often regarded as somewhat unbending’.21
To an extent, these arguments relate to questions of fusion, and AIB, for example,
is replete with references to the fusion debate.22 Australian judges have long debated
the development of equitable principles, particularly with the inﬂuence on legal
thinking of late adoption of the Judicature Act23 fusion in New South Wales.24 This
is not the place to reopen those wounds, beyond noting that the debate has been
particularly vigorous in the commercial context.25 But we may note that the issues
examined below are thrown into relief, and into the courts, by the increased
16. Lord Walker’s last judgment was in the Equity case of Pitt v Holt (known as Futter v
HMRC; Pitt v HMRC) [2013] UKSC 26.
17. J Rozenberg ‘Judicial appointments: new boys at the Supreme Court’ The Guardian 27
February 2013.
18. ‘I had no practical experience of many subjects which were the everyday work of the
[Chancery] division – such as company, trusts, insolvency, intellectual property and so on. It
was also a very lively time for the development of the law in many of those areas. To me they
were relatively uncharted territory. It was steep learning curve’: Lord Carnwath ‘People and
principle in the developing law’, address at the Eighth Biennial Conference on the Law of
Obligations: ‘Revolutions in Private Law’, Cambridge, 19 July 2016; available at https://www.
supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160719.pdf (accessed 14 April 2017).
19. Lord Collins sat in Scott v Southern Paciﬁc Mortgages Ltd & Ors [2014] UKSC 52 (giving
the lead judgment); FHR [2014] UKSC 45; Rubin & Anor v Euroﬁnance SA [2012] UKSC 46
(giving the lead judgment); and Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6.
20. Neuberger, above n 5, para 10.
21. F Reynolds ‘Commercial law’ in L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds) The
Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p 704 (speaking
of Lord Simonds).
22. See eg Lord Toulson’s opening at [1], ‘140 years after the Judicature Act 1873, the stitching
together of equity and the common law continues to cause problems at the seams’: AIB [2014]
UKSC 58. Lord Mansﬁeld was also a much-criticised proponent of fusion: Holdsworth, above
n 2, p 173.
23. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 64; Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972.
24. See PWYoung ‘Equity, contract and conscience’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds) Equity
in Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2005) p 489.
25. See eg JDHeydon ‘TheHon Roderick Pitt Meagher AOQC (1932–2011)’NSWBar News,
Winter 2011; MKirby ‘Equity’s Australian isolationism’ (2008) 8 Qld U Technol L & Just J 444;
W Gummow ‘Equity: too successful’ (2003) 77 Austral L J 30; K Mason ‘Fusion: fallacy, future
or ﬁnished?’ and W Gummow ‘Conclusion’, both in Degeling and Edelman, above n 24.
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willingness in recent years of lawyers for commercial actors to invoke the utility of
equitable concepts as ways of avoiding statutory or common law rules relating to
insolvency, limitation, and causation. Below, we consider the judicial responses to
these attempted innovations – sometimes the court removes established distinctions
between damages at law and compensation in equity,26 or avoids ﬁne distinctions
(as in FHR).27 The point was well made by Sir Anthony Mason:
The rise of the modem commercial economy … has raised in an acute form
important issues concerning the extension and application of equitable doctrines
and principles. That is because trusts are created in commercial settings and
commercial transactions are so structured that they provide scope for the creation
of relationships recognised in equity, with consequences for proprietary remedies
and for third parties.28
The inventiveness of equity has been exploited by lawyers seeking advantage in
commercial litigation, and that poses challenges.
The development of English commercial law owes, of course, a great debt to another
great judge Lord Mansﬁeld, and in his best endeavours in this ﬁeld, drew on both
common law and equity. As Hanbury observed:
In the ﬁeld of commercial law, equity missed its chances of capturing a large
jurisdiction owing to the scheme of incorporating that topic into the common
law which, it is not too much to say, formed the chief life-work of Lord Mansﬁeld.
That great judge, however, had a mind strongly imbued with equitable doctrine,
and was reported to have said on one occasion that he never liked common law
so well as when it resembled equity. The commercial law, therefore, which he
converted into common law, tends to be somewhat coloured by equity, and in
certain important branches of it equity has gained a very strong foothold.29
Our critique here is not framed in terms of common law versus equity, except in so far
as the common law position is preferred as part of the court’s commercialist common
sense approach.30 It is our contention that in the current period, albeit not necessarily
in as deliberate manner as More’s, nor (so far) as concerted as the efforts of Lord
Mansﬁeld,31 commercial law is colouring the law of equity.
26. See section 2 below.
27. See section 3 below.
28. A Mason ‘Equity’s role in the twentieth century’ (1997–1998) 8 King’s C L J 1 at 4.
29. HG Hanbury ‘The ﬁeld of modern equity’ (1929) 45 L Q Rev 196 at 200. See further
Holdsworth, above n 2, pp 160–175.
30. Hon Peter Young, the former Chief Judge in Equity in New South Wales, has contrasted
‘fusion’ with ‘ﬁssion’ in this context, in the sense of the development of principles by either
adoption or innovation: ‘Equity, contract and conscience’ in Degeling and Edelman, above n
24, pp 510–512.
31. Lord Mansﬁeld admired More’s valiant attempts to persuade common law judges to grant
relief:Wyllie vWilkes (1780) 2 Douglas 519 at 523. LordMansﬁeld may also have been the source
for the line (via Harman J) that ‘Equity ought not to be presumed to be past the age of child-
bearing’: Sir R Evershed ‘Equity ought not to be presumed to be past the age of child-bearing’
(1953) 1 Sydney L Rev 1 at fn 1.
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Our study also has signiﬁcant implications for the balance of expertise on the Supreme
Court. Six vacancies will arise on the Court before the end of 2018,32 and several of
those retiring Justices are those who have played key roles in the cases considered here
(Lords Neuberger, Mance, Toulson and Sumption). The Court has announced that it will
hold the two joint selection exercises to appoint three Justices in each round. This
approach followed a review of the appointments process by Jenny Rowe, the former
Chief Executive of the Court,33 and seeks to encourage applicants from a diverse range
of backgrounds and specialisms.34 The trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions on
equity re-emphasises the need for Chancery expertise amongst the Justices.
2. COMPENSATORY LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF TRUST
(a) One law of trusts or two?
In Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns, Lord Browne-Wilkinson famously said that in order
not to render a trust ‘commercially useless’,35 the courts must distinguish between
‘basic principles of trust and those specialist rules developed in relation to traditional
trusts which are applicable only to such trusts and the rationale of which has no
application to trusts of quite a different kind’.36 Where equitable compensation for
breach of trust is concerned, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that the basic rule is that
the beneﬁciary is entitled to compensation for losses that are suffered but for the
breach.37 Relevantly, the specialist rule of reconstitution of the trust fund does not apply
in the context of a commercial bare trust once the underlying transaction has been
completed.38 In his view, the rationale of reconstitution – ‘no one beneﬁciary is entitled
to the trust property and the need to compensate all beneﬁciaries for the trust’39 – is
irrelevant for cases such as Target Holdings.
32. ‘Statement on Supreme Court appointments process’; available at https://www.
supremecourt.uk/news/statement-on-supreme-court-appointments-process.html (accessed 28
September 2016). Lord Toulson retired on 22 September 2016 (but will continue to sit on an
ad hoc basis): the other ﬁve Justices – Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Mance, Lord Hughes
and Lord Sumption –will all retire in 2018. See further Lord Neuberger ‘The role of the Supreme
Court seven years on – lessons learnt’, Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, 21 November
2016, para 52; available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-161121.pdf (accessed 14
April 2017).
33. ‘Chief Executive’s review of the process followed by Selection Commissions making
recommendations for appointment to The Supreme Court’ (July 2015); available at https://
www.supremecourt.uk/docs/review-of-selection-commission-process-july-2015.pdf (accessed
28 September 2016). Neuberger, above n 32, paras 52–58.
34. Concern about the need for Chancery specialism was noted by one of the Chief Executive’s
consultees: ibid, para 4. For his part, Lord Sumption has professed scepticism as to the value of
specialisms: ‘I have always taken the view that legal specialisations are essentially bogus. At the
bar, I liked to trespass on other people’s cabbage patches. As a judge I do it most of the time.’ Lord
Sumption ‘Family law at a distance’, At a Glance Conference 2016, Royal College of Surgeons, 8
June 2016, at 1; available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160608.pdf) (accessed
14 April 2017). See J Lee ‘The judicial individuality of Lord Sumption’ (2017) 40(2) U NSW
L J (forthcoming).
35. Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 435.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid, at 436.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid, at 434–436.
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The proposed binary classiﬁcation of basic and specialist principles has the potential
to change the content of trust law fundamentally. Traditionally, equity caters for a range
of different breaches, distinguishing between cases of misapplication of trust assets and
cases involving lack of prudence and diligence on the part of the trustee. In equitable
parlance, the liability ﬂows from the trustee’s primary duty to account for his
stewardship.40 Where there is a misapplication of trust assets, the beneﬁciary can
choose to falsify the account:41 the unauthorised disbursement would be disallowed,
giving rise to a shortfall in the trust estate that the trustee becomes liable to make good,
either in specie or by paying the monetary equivalent. The objective of the falsiﬁed
account is to provide the substitutive performance of the obligation; that is, to treat
the misapplied assets as being still in the trust fund.42 Causation between loss and
breach is therefore irrelevant. On the other hand, where the trustee has, through the lack
of diligence or prudence, caused loss to the trust fund, the beneﬁciary can surcharge the
account. As the surcharging of account has a reparative aim, causation between breach
and loss is relevant to the monetary liability derived therefrom.
Target Holdings concerned a misapplication of trust funds by the conveyancing
solicitors who held the monies on trust for the lender pending completion of the
mortgage transaction. Contrary to the lender’s instructions, the solicitors paid away
the funds to the borrower without obtaining the required security, although the security
was executed a month later. Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the transaction was
‘completed’, and the lender–beneﬁciary was therefore not entitled to reconstitution of
the trust fund. However, in Youyang v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher, the High Court
of Australia explicitly disagreed with such a context-based application of remedial
principles.43
While much criticism has been directed at the commercial and non-commercial
divide,44 less attention has been paid to the corollary ‘basic’ and ‘specialist’
distinction in remedial principles. As explained above, the falsiﬁcation and
surcharging of accounts are simply principles developed for different kinds of
breaches that occur in both commercial and traditional trusts. Yet, by labelling
one as the ‘basic’ trust principle, primacy is accorded to the compensatory aspect
of trust law, while downplaying the custodianship feature of the trust relationship
upon which the falsiﬁcation of account is based. Importantly, viewed against the
commercial and non-commercial divide, the basic and specialist principle distinction
is indicative of covert judicial rewriting of what is the norm and what is the
exception, by prioritising what is deemed ﬁtting for the commercial setting. As
we shall go on to argue, this inﬂuence of commercial thinking is apparent in other
recent equity and trusts cases from the highest courts of the various common law
jurisdictions.
40. Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1513].
41. If the unauthorised disbursement turns out to be proﬁtable, the beneﬁciary may choose to
adopt it. See Millett, above n 11, at 226.
42. For this reason, the trustee is liable to account for the entire misapplied sum, regardless of
whether the trust estate would have sustained the same measure of loss even if the duty was duly
performed.
43. Youyang [2003] HCA 15 at [49].
44. See eg J Edelman ‘Money awards of the cost of performance’ (2010) 4 J Eq 122 at [127–128].
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The ‘rewriting’ of trust law is facilitated by the equitable accounting rules
descending into neglect historically owing to changes in practice45 – most notably,
the rise of the terminology of ‘equitable compensation’, which replaced the language
of accounting. The differentiation between the awards derived from falsiﬁcation and
surcharging of accounts respectively became obscured as a result. Target Holdings
exempliﬁes the increasingly common practice of the courts assessing equitable
compensation without reference to the accounting rules. The controversial reasoning
of Target Holdings – at least, to equity traditionalists – led to a proliferation of
modern scholarship on the equitable account,46 much of which is written with the
hope of fully reviving them in practice to bring about clarity to the law of equitable
compensation for breach of trust.47 But these efforts failed to persuade. In the
landmark case of AIB, the UK Supreme Court afﬁrmed that the basic principle is this:
equitable compensation serves a reparative function – it is available for losses
suffered but for the breach of duty.48
AIB arose from a commercial remortgage transaction. AIB advanced £3.3 million to
the solicitors to hold on trust pending completion. The solicitors were instructed to
redeem the existing charge over the borrowers’ home in favour of Barclays Bank out
of the advance, obtain a ﬁrst charge over the property in favour of AIB and then release
the remaining funds to the borrowers. In breach of trust, the solicitors failed to transfer
sufﬁcient money to Barclays Bank to fully redeem the existing charge – the shortfall
being approximately £309,000. This resulted in excessive funding being released to
the borrowers. AIB managed to obtain a second charge over the property in pursuance
to negotiations with Barclays Bank. The borrowers subsequently defaulted. Owing to
the prevailing depressed market conditions, the property was sold for only £1.2 million.
After paying off £309,000 that was due to Barclays Bank, AIB only obtained £867,697.
It then sued the solicitors for approximately £2.5 million, being the difference between
the loan and the amount it recovered from the sale.
The Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the solicitors, ruling that AIB
was only entitled to £275,000, being the loss it suffered by comparison with what it
would have received had there been no breach. Afﬁrming Target Holdings, both Lord
Reed and Lord Toulson were of the view that English law had clearly moved on from
the days of equitable account.49 Equitable compensation was to be derived from
moving from the breach of duty directly to the remedy, without reference to the
45. Justice Edelman (extrajudicially), ‘An English misturning with equitable compensation’
(UNSWAustralia colloquium on equitable compensation and disgorgement of proﬁt, 7–8 August
2015); available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/
edelman-j-201508 (accessed 7 June 2016).
46. See eg Millett, above n 11; S Elliott ‘Remoteness criteria in equity’ (2002) 65 Mod L Rev
588; S Elliott and C Mitchell ‘Remedies for dishonest assistance’ (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 16; J
Edelman ‘Money awards of the cost of performance’ (2010) 4 J Eq 122; J Glister ‘Equitable
compensation’ in J Glister and P Ridge (eds) Fault Lines in Equity (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2012) p 143; CMitchell ‘Equitable compensation for breach of ﬁduciary duty’ (2013) 66 Current
Legal Probs 307.
47. Cf C Rickett ‘Where are we going with equitable compensation?’ In A Oakley (ed) Trends
in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p 29; A Burrows ‘We do
this at common law and that in equity’ (2002) 22 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 at 10–11.
48. AIB [2014] 3WLR 1367 at [73] (Lord Toulson) and [136] (Lord Reed). See also PG Turner
‘The new fundamental norm of recovery for losses to express trusts’ (2015) 74 Camb L J 188.
49. AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [69] (Lord Toulson) and [138] (Lord Reed).
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accounting principles.50 In Lord Toulson’s view, the falsiﬁcation of account is simply a
legal ‘fairy tale’.51
Relevantly, both Lord Toulson and Lord Reed, writing separately,52 rejected a
context-based approach towards the application of remedial principles for breach of
trust. They clariﬁed that the presence of an underlying contract in the commercial
context is merely a fact to be considered in determining the losses caused by the breach
of trust.53 Indeed, Lord Reed interpreted Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s context-based
analysis in Target Holdings to result in a difference in the procedure of payment (to
whom the payment is made), as opposed to the quantum of payment.54
But Lord Toulson’s judgment, on close scrutiny, does not fully support a context-
neutral approach. Lord Toulson said that ‘the extent of equitable compensation should
be the same as if damages for breach of contract were sought at common law’ in cases
such as Target Holdings.55 Moreover, he went on to endorse the application of Lord
Browne-Wilkinson’s reasoning in Target Holdings to the AIB dispute, on the basis that
the transaction in AIB was similarly ‘completed’.56 But it should not be missed that
unlike Target Holdings, where the required security was obtained belatedly post-
breach, the same was not achieved in AIB. In so doing, Lord Toulson unwittingly
entrenched a context-based approach (of a different kind) towards remedial principles
for breach of trust by extending Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis. The point is this:
the unavailability of the reconstitution of trust in Target Holdings did not affect the
outcome of the case because the trust estate eventually received the sought for asset,
thereby justifying the premature disbursement of funds. An analysis by way of
falsiﬁcation of outcome would have produced the same result.57 Lord Toulson’s
pragmatic understanding of ‘completion’ of transaction, on the other hand, would have
produced different outcomes.
The combined effect of Target Holdings and AIB (which unreservedly afﬁrmed the
former) is therefore difﬁcult to grasp and articulate, as Foskett J conceded in Various
Claimants v Giambrone & Law (A Firm).58 In Purrunsing v A’Court & Co (a ﬁrm),
Judge Pelling QC, citing Lord Toulson’s judgment, interpreted AIB as being ‘concerned
with the measure of equitable compensation for breach of trust that applies where there
has been a breach of a bare trust arising in the context of a commercial contract to which
the trustee and beneﬁciary are parties’.59 He thus commented that equitable
50. J Glister ‘Breach of trust and consequential loss’ (2014) 8 J Eq 235 at 238, 258.
51. AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [69].
52. With both of whom Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale and Lord Wilson agreed.
53. AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [71] (Lord Toulson) and [137] (Lord Reed).
54. Ibid, at [108].
55. Ibid, at [71].
56. Ibid, at [74]. This part of Lord Toulson’s reasoning contradicts his earlier insistence that the
same general principles would apply in respect of both commercial and traditional trusts.
57. See Millett, above n 11, at 227 and (as Lord Millett NPJ) in Libertarian Investments Ltd v
Hall [2014] 1 HKC 369.
58. [2015] EWHC 1946 (QB) (see Appendix 3 (Supplemental Judgment) at [7]).
59. [2016] EWHC 789 (Ch) at [42]. The case concerned breach of trust by the vendor’s
solicitors and the purchaser’s solicitors in paying purchase money away to the vendor who
fraudulently claimed to be the true registered proprietor of the property. The case did not concern
the assessment of equitable compensation for breach of trust speciﬁcally. A main issue before the
court was discretionary relief from liability under s 61 of the Trustees Act 1925. Counsel for the
vendor’s solicitor relied on AIB – speciﬁcally, Lord Toulson’s point that the solicitor–trustee’s
liability in equity ought not exceed his liability at law – in his argument that a more favourable
standard of ‘reasonableness’ should be applied to his client.
The commercialisation of equity 9
© 2017 The Society of Legal Scholars
compensation should be the same as if contractual damages are sought only in cases
where there is an underlying contract.60 On such an interpretation, equitable
compensation would be assessed differently where there is no underlying contract,
thereby giving rise to two sets of compensatory principles for breach of trust.61
The unacknowledged (or unappreciated) development of two sets of equitable
principles is potentially dangerous, though not unprecedented.62 It is dangerous because
the adaptation of equitable principles in response to the commercial context has
occurred without proper justiﬁcation and is discreetly being passed off as part of the
general principles. While the common law (in its broad sense of judge-made law,
including equity) envisages the incremental development of its principles over the
course of time, such progressive changes are to take place by way of transparent and
sound reasoning.
(b) Equitable compensation and the trustee’s obligation
Taking a chronological overview of the evolution of remedial principles for breach of
trust, we see the initial equal and co-existence of falsiﬁcation and surcharging of
accounts in the days of equitable account, which later evolved to the bifurcation
between the basic principle (compensation) and the specialist principle (reconstitution)
in Target Holdings and ﬁnally arriving at just compensation for breach of trust in AIB. It
may be said that the commercial context – from which the disputes in both Target
Holdings and AIB arose – is a key driver of the emergence of the equitable
compensatory principle for breach of trust. The contract, from which the commercial
trust arose in Target Holdings and AIB, fortiﬁed the analogical bridge between equitable
compensation for breach of trust and damages for breach of contract.63 The court’s
attention was intensely focused on the bigger picture of performance of the transaction,
as opposed to the speciﬁc snapshot of custodianship provided by the trust institution in
the transactional process. In AIB, Lord Reed reﬂected thus:
As the case law on equitable compensation develops, however, the reasoning
supporting the assessment of compensation can be seen more clearly to reﬂect an
analysis of the characteristics of the particular obligation breached. This increase in
transparency permits greater scope for developing rules which are coherent with those
adopted in the common law.64
60. Purrunsing [2016] EWHC 789 (Ch) at [42].
61. This raises the issue of incidental rules for concurrent liability, although Lord Toulson did
not explicitly address liability for equitable compensation in that particular context.
62. Another example is the reinterpretation of the content of ‘irreducible core’ of a trustee’s
obligations in Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance SA [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 475, a dispute arising
in the debt securitisation context. See A Trukhtanov ‘The irreducible core of trust obligations’
(2007) 123 L Q Rev 342; M Yip ‘The commercial context in trust law’ [2016] Conv 347 at
356–359.
63. The compensatory principle in contract law has been recently afﬁrmed on numerous
occasions: Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007]
UKHL 12; [2007] 2 AC 535; Flame SA v Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd (The Glory Wealth)
EWHC 3153 (Comm); Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All ER 1082;
Commodities Suisse SA v MT Maritime Management BV (The MTM Hong Kong) [2015] EWHC
2505 (Comm).
64. AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [138].
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The golden victory of the equitable compensatory principle, however, has profound
implications for the contemporary content of a trustee’s obligations. That a bare trust
is employed as part of the machinery of the trust does not alter the bare trustee’s
obligation, like the obligations of trustees in traditional trusts, to ‘get the trust property
in, protect it, and vindicate the rights attaching to it’.65 The traditional falsiﬁcation of
account arises from the acknowledgement of the trustee’s custodianship: conceptually,
a falsiﬁed account creates an immediate ‘debt’ between the trustee and the beneﬁciary
in the value of the misapplied assets.66 This explains the reference to an ‘equitable debt’
in older English cases. In AIB, Lord Toulson, seemingly without a full appreciation of
the underlying conceptual signiﬁcance, hastily concluded that the terminology had been
replaced by the vocabulary of ‘equitable compensation’.67 The English abolition of the
accounting rules – in particular, the falsiﬁcation of account – is silently reforming the
core obligation of trusteeship. More generally, as we argue here, it is symptomatic of
a primacy of commercialist pragmatism in the Supreme Court’s reasoning. Quite
clearly, the Supreme Court’s objective in AIB was to simplify the remedial rules for
breach of trust. Speciﬁcally, on Lord Toulson’s approach, equitable liability is aligned
with contractual liability where there is an underlying contract, thereby allowing
commercial parties to measure their liability based on a single standard.
We now move on to examine the Supreme Court’s reasoning in FHR, a landmark
judgment not only for the issue it resolved but also for how it was resolved, most
remarkably, by way of Lord Neuberger’s unexplained desertion of his own previous
opinion.
3. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: PROPRIETARY RELIEF FOR
UNAUTHORISED BENEFITS
(a) Constructive trust over unauthorised gains: commercial considerations
In FHR, the Supreme Court ﬁnally resolved the seemingly endless debate in English
law concerning whether an agent held a bribe or secret commission received in
breach of his ﬁduciary duty on trust for his principal. The answer given by the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment delivered by Lord Neuberger, was a
resounding ‘yes’. The state of English law before FHR was complex and unwieldy,
with 200 years of inconsistent judgments and voluminous academic writing on the
subject.68 Yet, the answer to this question has important practical implications for
the principal, most notably, with regard to the nature of injunctive relief available,
the ability to invoke equitable tracing rules and priority in the event of the ﬁduciary’s
insolvency.
As a matter of principle, there are broadly two camps to the debate. Those in
favour of proprietary relief generally base their arguments on the scope of the
65. Fischer v Nemeske Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 11 at [111] (Gaegler J).
66. Edelman, above n 45. See also RS French CJ ‘Equitable compensation’, Hong Kong, 23
September 2015 and McIntosh v Fisk [2015] NZCA 74 at [20] (French and Harrison JJ).
67. AIB [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [61].
68. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [1]. When the same case was in the Court of Appeal, Pill LJ
remarked that ‘[c]onsideration of the views of commentators and practitioners generally on the
subject of constructive trusts in the law of England and Wales reveals passions of a force
uncommon in the legal world’: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2013] EWCA Civ
17 at [61].
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agency/ﬁduciary obligation,69 treating the principal as being entitled to the beneﬁts,
whether authorised or unauthorised, received by the agent in the course of the
agency. Detractors, on the other hand, champion the hard-nosed principles of
property law that proprietary interests cannot arise over beneﬁts that are not derived
from the principal’s assets.70 Lord Neuberger’s previous view in Sinclair
Investments belonged to the latter camp. In that case, he laid down a controversial
‘two-category’ test that required some form of proprietary connection between the
unauthorised beneﬁts and the principal’s assets (or assets that should properly belong
to the principal) to justify proprietary relief.71 Although Sinclair Investments (UK)
Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in admin rec)72 did not concern the taking of
a bribe or secret commission, Lord Neuberger’s approach clearly ruled out
proprietary relief in such a scenario.73
In a surprisingly short judgment handed down by LordNeuberger, the SupremeCourt
in FHR found a path straight out of the thicket by prioritising simplicity and practicality.
Decisions such as Tyrrell v Bank of London,74Metropolitan Bank v Heiron75 and Lister
& Co v Stubbs,76 which held against the imposition of a constructive trust, were
overruled.77 Lord Neuberger therefore repented78 from his decision in Sinclair
Investments to follow the aforementioned authorities, instead of Attorney General of
Hong Kong v Reid.79 In Sinclair Investments, Lord Neuberger MR (as he then was,
delivering the leading judgment) provided seven reasons – ranging from precedent,
principle, policy and ill-considered reasoning – as to why Reid should not be followed
and probably would not be followed by the Supreme Court.80
69. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [33]. See eg Lord Millett ‘Bribes and secret commissions’
[1993] RLR 7; Lord Millett ‘Bribes and secret commissions again’ (2012) 71 Camb L J 583.
See also an analysis based on attribution, divorced from wrongdoing by Lionel Smith: L Smith
‘Constructive trusts and the no-proﬁt rule’ [2013] Camb L J 260; L Smith ‘Deterrence,
prophylaxis and punishment in ﬁduciary obligation’ (2013) 7 J Eq 87.
70. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [31]. See eg R Goode ‘Proprietary restitutionary claims” in WR
Cornish et al. (eds) Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) ch 5; SWorthington ‘Fiduciary duties and proprietary remedies:
addressing the failure of equitable formulae’ (2013) 72 Camb L J 720.
71. [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [88]. Essentially, a constructive trust would only arise over an asset
received by a ﬁduciary in breach of ﬁduciary duty where the asset is or has been the beneﬁcial
property of the beneﬁciary (category 1) or it was acquired by taking an advantage of an
opportunity or a right that properly belonged the beneﬁciary (category 2). The decision received
mixed reviews: see egDHayton ‘Proprietary liability for secret proﬁts’ (2011) 127LQRev 487;R
Goode ‘Proprietary liability for secret proﬁts: a reply’ (2011) 127 L Q Rev 493; G Virgo ‘Proﬁts
obtained in breach of ﬁduciary duty: personal and proprietary claim?’ (2011) 70 Camb L J 502.
72. [2011] 3 WLR 1153 (Sinclair Investments).
73. Lord Neuberger’s reasoning in Sinclair Investments was later applied by Newey J in
Cadogan Petroleum plc v Tolley [2011] EWHC 2286, a case concerning secret commissions.
74. (1859) 27 Beav 273. See a detailed analysis of the House of Lords’ decision: P Watts
‘Tyrrell v Bank of London – an inside look at an inside job’ (2013) 129 L Q Rev 527.
75. (1880) 45 Ex D 319.
76. (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (Lister & Stubbs).
77. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [47] and [50].
78. Ibid, at [50].
79. [1994] 1 AC 324 at [73]–[84]. Reid has been afﬁrmed and followed by the English High
Court in Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2005] 4 All ER 73; Ultraframe
(UK) Ltd v Fielding [2006] FSR 17.
80. Sinclair Investments [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [76]–[84].
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Lord Neuberger PSC’s (as he now is) tergiversation in FHR, merely 3 years after
Sinclair Investments, is, to say the least, unexpected: indeed, his Lordship has himself
described it as ‘a damascene conversion’.81 Importantly, his judgment in FHR did not
directly engage in principle,82 notwithstanding his claim that it was a decision arrived
based on both principle and practicality.83 In fact, his Lordship went as far to say that
the debate was one that had no ‘plainly right or plainly wrong answer’ and that there
‘can clearly be different views’ as to the proper requirements for the creation of a
proprietary interest.84 There are four main reasons – proceeding chieﬂy from concerns
of policy and practicality – for the Supreme Court’s preferred approach. First, Lord
Neuberger said that the right answer to the debate is ‘the simple’ one because ‘clarity
and simplicity are desirable qualities in the law’.85 Secondly, there is no reason why the
principal of a ﬁduciary who took a bribe or secret commission should be in a worse-off
position than one whose ﬁduciary had obtained an unauthorised beneﬁt in less
blameworthy circumstances.86 Thirdly, ‘wider policy considerations’ justify the
availability of proprietary relief. Lord Neuberger acknowledged the evils of bribery
and secret commissions and their harmful impact on the commercial world as well as
the wider society.87 Finally, he opined that it is desirable for English law to cohere with
the approaches taken by the rest of the common law world.88
We argue that the Supreme Court’s analysis, in particular Lord Neuberger’s
remarkable volte-face, is underlined by commercial considerations. Disputes
concerning secret commissions frequently, if not invariably, arise in the commercial
context, as was the case in FHR. In FHR, the buyers of a hotel claimed against their
consultant, appointed as the buyers’ agent in the sale negotiations, for receiving an
undisclosed commission from the seller. As for bribes,89 they are frequently offered to
another party (for instance, public ofﬁcials90) to obtain a business advantage. In Lord
Neuberger’s view, a rule that excludes proprietary relief for bribes and secret
commissions based on subtle distinctions – which can be drawn variously – of what is
considered to be the principal’s property does not promote certainty.91 Post FHR,
commenting extrajudicially on the English rejection of the remedial constructive trust,
81. Lord Neuberger ‘The remedial constructive trust – fact or ﬁction’, at the Banking Services
and Finance Law Association Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand, 10 August 2014, para 2;
available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf (accessed 28 September
2016).
82. See also D Whayman ‘Proprietary remedy conﬁrmed for bribes and secret commissions’
[2014] Conv 518 at 521.
83. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [32] and [46].
84. Ibid, at [32].
85. Ibid, at [35].
86. Ibid, at [41].
87. Ibid, at [42].
88. Ibid, at [45].
89. Although conventional reference differentiates between a bribe and a secret commission,
the substantive distinctions are not immediately clear.
90. Indeed, the policy basis for the standalone offence of ‘bribery of a foreign public ofﬁcial’
under s 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 is to ‘prohibit the inﬂuencing of decision making in the context
of publicly funded business opportunities by the inducement of personal enrichment of foreign
public ofﬁcials or to others at the ofﬁcial’s request, assent or acquiescence’. See the Bribery
Act 2010 – Guidance at p 11; available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/
bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (accessed 28 September 2016).
91. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35].
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Lord Neuberger reiterated the need for predictability in respect of legal principles in
‘these days of expensive litigation and complex and cross-border commercial
transactions’.92 The Supreme Court’s intuitive preference for a simple answer may thus
be explained by the fact that the problem of bribes and secret commissions almost always
arises in the commercial context.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s tough stance is consistent with the ‘zero tolerance’
attitude enshrined in the Bribery Acts 2010 as well as international conventions.93
The Bribery Act 2010 came into force in the UK on 1 July 2011.94 A main objective
of the Bribery Act 2010 is to eradicate corruption and bribery in the commercial world
– it does so through various means, including requiring commercial organisations to put
in place procedures to prevent persons associated with it from bribery. The national
policy on bribery and corruption was therefore crystal clear by the time of appeal before
the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The clear availability of proprietary relief in
cases concerning bribes and secret commissions under English law provides stronger
deterrence95 than personal relief against such forms of wrongdoing.96
Even Lord Neuberger’s comment on harmonisation of legal principles97 within the
common law world is in part underpinned by practical and commercial concerns.
Extrajudicially, in the course of reﬂecting upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
FHR, Lord Neuberger commented that ‘in an increasingly global and competitive
world, where most legal systems are civilian, the common law jurisdictions need to
ensure a degree of coherence and consistency in their case-law in order to present a
credible and effective legal system’.98 Here, Lord Neuberger clearly meant judicial
competition for international litigation business,99 and such claims are chieﬂy of a
92. Neuberger, above n 81. It should also be noted that Lord Neuberger, in the same speech,
said that where the domestic context is concerned, some (though not himself) ‘may think certainty
[of legal principles] is less important’. Lord Sumption has underlined English law’s opposition to
the remedial constructive trust in Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1WLR 3179 at [27]. The case
is considered below.
93. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [42].
94. The legislation entered into force after the key events of the FHR dispute had taken place.
There was therefore no question of criminal liability on the part of the commercial parties in FHR
under the Act.
95. Cf K Barnett ‘Distributive justice and proprietary remedies over bribes’ (2015) 35 Legal
Stud 302 at 305–306.
96. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [42].
97. Supported by Leeming JA in Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd;Curtis v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd
[2014] NSWCA 266 at [71]: ‘There is frequently much to be learnt from the experience of other
jurisdictions whose legal systems share a common ancestor’. Cf French CJ, extrajudicially:
‘There is a degree of commonality in our jurisdictions but some important issues are ongoing
including the proper scope of equitable compensation and how it may differ according to the
nature of the equitable wrong’ (RS French, above n 66, at 28).
98. Neuberger, above n 5.
99. See the success of the English Commercial Court in attracting international litigation: The
Honourable Mrs Justice Carr, ‘Closing address for British Turkish Lawyers Association seminar
– the Inner Temple’ (13 September 2013), available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/
uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/justice-carr-btla-190913.pdf (accessed 28September 2016); J
Croft ‘Three-quarters of litigants in UK Commercial Court are foreign’ The Financial Times 29
May 2014. See further the introduction of the Financial List, a specialist court to deal withﬁnancial
claims: G McMeel ‘A new ﬁnancial court for London’ [2016] Lloyd’s Mar & Com L Q 1.
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commercial nature or arising from the commercial context. Part of the aim is therefore to
develop a set of legal principles that will encourage the choice of English law as the
governing law of contracts, which will most probably lead to the choice of English
courts100 – being the forum most conversant in the application of English law – for
the resolution of disputes arising therefrom.
Hence, harmonisation of legal developments is pursued partly for pragmatic reasons.
If harmonisation is a desirable end in itself, Lord Neuberger or English law101 would be
far more open to recognising a remedial constructive trust, a doctrine that has been
afﬁrmed in a number of common law jurisdictions; namely, Australia,102 Canada,103
New Zealand104 and Singapore.105 The objection against the recognition of a remedial
constructive trust generally emanates from concerns of unconstitutional redistribution
of property rights based on judicial discretion and the uncertainty of its operation being
founded upon exercise of judicial discretion.106 However, the same concern of
‘redistribution of property rights’ arises in respect of the Supreme Court’s decision in
FHR. While explicitly rejecting the ‘property law’ camp of academic views on the
debate for generating uncertainty, there was a tinge of equivocation in Lord Neuberger’s
reasoning. He said that ‘in many cases, the bribe or commissions will very often have
reduced the beneﬁt from the relevant transaction which the principal will have obtained,
and therefore can fairly be said to be his property’.107 And while Lord Neuberger
adopted counsel’s argument that ‘any beneﬁt acquired by the agent as a result of his
agency and in breach of his ﬁduciary duty is held on trust for the principal’,108 he
seemingly did so largely because the simple answer is the right answer (following
Occam’s Razor).109 For, if otherwise, his Lordship would not have considered the
debate to be one with ‘no plainly right answer’.110
(b) FHR: implications for modern equity
The lack of a clear conceptual basis for the FHR decision has profound implications for
trust law. First, it is harder than before to identify a single unifying principle to explain
100. Whether pre-dispute by way of a choice of court agreement or post-dispute.
101. Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [27].
102. See egMuschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; John Alexander’s Club Pty Ltd v White
City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1.
103. See eg LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 61 DLR 14.
104. Regal Castings Limited v Lightbody [2009] NZLR 433; John Hanita Pak v AG of New
Zealand [2014] NZSC 18 at [163] (Elias CJ) and [297]-[312] (Young J). However, the
availability of a remedial constructive trust under New Zealand law has yet to be conclusively
determined by the New Zealand Court of Appeal: see Boat Harbour Holdings Ltd v Mowat
[2012] NZCA 305 at [51]; Strategic Finance Ltd (in receivership and in liquidation) v Bridgman
[2013] NZCA 357 at [122]–[126].
105. See eg Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801.
106. Neuberger, above n 81.
107. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [43].
108. Ibid, at [35] (see also [33]). See also trenchant criticisms by Campbell: JC Campbell
‘When and why a bribe is held on a constructive trust: the method of reasoning towards an
equitable remedy’ (2015) 39 Austral Bar Rev 320 at 321–325.
109. Cf Lord Sumption in Jetivia SA & Anor v Bilta (UK) Ltd at [104]: ‘I agree with Lord
Toulson and Lord Hodge that Occam’s Razor is a valuable analytical tool, but only if it is
correctly understood. Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Do not gratuitously
multiply your postulates.’
110. FHR [2014] 3 WLR 535 at [35].
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why constructive trusts arise,111 save for a rationalisation pitched at a high level of
abstraction, such as ‘unconscionability’.112 Secondly, the FHR decision creates the
possibility for courts to award proprietary relief in circumstances based on
considerations of policy and practicality113 – the emergence of legal realism that was
not previously well received by English law. It is difﬁcult to predict when a constructive
trust will arise in a new set of circumstances. Thirdly, the interplay between proprietary
and personal relief (account of proﬁts)114 for receiving unauthorised beneﬁts in breach
of ﬁduciary duty has been transformed. A consequence of FHR is the availability of
proprietary relief in nearly every case.115 Accordingly, the interplay between the two
kinds of remedies is presently far less concerned with availability; it has instead become
primarily concerned with election by the claimant.116
The inﬁltration of the ﬁduciary doctrine into the commercial world accentuates
problems (taking of bribes and secret commissions) that are infrequently
encountered in the domestic context. In one sense, FHR redirects our attention
to focus on the severity of wrongdoing in crafting appropriate remedies,117 as
opposed to the kind of wrongdoing. Lord Neuberger’s previous view in Sinclair
Investments distinguished between ‘abuse of principal’s property’ cases and ‘abuse
of position’ cases.118 That view was conservatively focused on the proprietary
foundation of the constructive trust, and might fairly represent the wisdom of
an era where equity sharply distinguished between property rights and personal
obligations. FHR, on the other hand, treats the remedy as a means to deter
wrongdoing and enforce primary obligations. Underlining the FHR decision is
therefore a decision to shape equitable principles to appropriately respond to the
issues that arise in the commercial context, in partnership with domestic statute
and international inﬂuence. By afﬁrming that a principal is entitled to assert a
proprietary claim over beneﬁts received by a ﬁduciary in breach of his loyalty
(personal obligation), regardless of whether they are derived from the interference
with the principal’s property, English law has further blurred the divide between
obligation and property. This brings to mind Worthington’s argument a decade
ago: ‘equity, according to persistent commercial pressure, has effectively
111. G Virgo The Principles of Equity & Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn,
2016) pp 305, 327–328. See further section 4 below.
112. Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar and Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 408 (Millett LJ).
113. See Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399 at [170]. Lord Neuberger holds the view that correct
legal analysis is ‘not the centrally important issue’, if the question confronting the court is based
on policy.
114. Account of proﬁts continues to exist in English law: see Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk
[2014] WLR (D) 297; Global Energy Horizons Corporation v Gray [2015] EWHC 2232 (Ch).
115. Whayman, above n 82, at 524.
116. A corollary consequence is that there is no longer the concern that the account is unable to
‘mop up’ all the unauthorised beneﬁts that a ﬁduciary has derived from the breach of duty.
117. Although some may take the view that the effect of FHR is to accord equal remedial
treatment to all breaches of ﬁduciary duty (see Whayman, above n 82, at 523–524), it should not
be missed that where a ﬁduciary has acted in good faith, he may be awarded equitable allowance
(seeBoardman v Phipps [1964] 1WLR 993). As such, it is certainly arguable that the real effect of
FHR, mapped on to existing principles, is to craft remedies based on severity of wrongdoing.
118. Sinclair Investments [2011] 3 WLR 1153 at [80]. Lord Neuberger said that there is a
‘fundamental distinction between (i) a ﬁduciary enriching himself by depriving a claimant of
asset and (ii) a ﬁduciary enriching himself by doing a wrong to the claimant’.
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eliminated the divide between property and obligation, or between property rights
and personal rights’.119 To put it simply, FHR says that what you are ‘owed’
becomes what you ‘own’.
Finally, FHR is seemingly difﬁcult to reconcile with the subsequent Supreme Court
decision in Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd,120 complicating matters yet further. In Bailey,
Lord Sumption said in obiter121 that a constructive trust recognised by Bingham J in
Neste Oy v Lloyd’s Bank Plc122 was unjustiﬁable. TheNeste Oy constructive trust is said
to arise over money held by an agent whom, receiving the same for its principal or on its
account, could not in good conscience retain the money owing to the agent’s
insolvency. Lord Sumption, taking the side of the ‘property law’ camp in Bailey,123
criticised the holding in Neste Oy as being contrary to the requirement of identiﬁable
trust property in order for a trust to arise under English law. This is because the money
in that case was transferred to the agent with intention that he received full beneﬁcial
ownership. In rejecting the Neste Oy constructive trust, Lord Sumption ironically relied
on124 an excerpt from Goode’s paper125 in which Goode clearly opposed awarding
proprietary relief for bribes and secret commissions received in breach of ﬁduciary
duty. Perhaps conscious of the potential inconsistency with FHR, Lord Sumption then
pronounced that a constructive trust may nevertheless arise over money paid with the
intention of transferring the beneﬁcial interest to the recipient where the intention
was vitiated (eg on the basis of mistake) or the money represented the fruits of fraud,
theft or breach of trust/ﬁduciary duty.126
Lord Sumption’s disapproval of the Neste Oy constructive trust is not the issue. The
issue lies with his reasoning, which in part contradicts Lord Neuberger’s judgment in
FHR. Moreover, notwithstanding Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s criticisms inWestdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC,127 Lord Sumption – with respect, rather
evasively – appeared not completely averse towards proprietary restitution for mistake,
in particular, as a possible, alternative basis for the outcome in Bailey.128 His Lordship
declined to consider the alternative mistake analysis129 on the basis that it would go
beyond the scope of the appeal;130 and yet his Lordship’s disapproval of Neste Oy
was itself obiter, given the prior conclusion as to the agent’s authority on the ﬁrst point
of the appeal.131
Such subtle (and partial) judicial tergiversation in the already troubled equitable
waters further illustrates the Supreme Court’s propensity for subjecting trust law
119. S Worthington ‘The disappearing divide between property and obligation: the impact of
aligning legal analysis and commercial expectations’ (2007) 42 Tex Int’l L J 918.
120. [2016] 1WLR 3179. See PWatts ‘The insolvency of agents’ (2017) 133 LQRev 11 and H
Wong ‘Proprietary restitution and constructive trusts in the Supreme Court’ [2016] Conv 480.
121. With whom Lords Neuberger, Clarke, Carnwath and Hodge agreed.
122. [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658, followed in In re Japan Leasing Europe Plc [1999] BPIR 911.
123. See discussion above at text to n 67.
124. Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [26].
125. R Goode ‘Ownership and obligation in commercial transactions’ (1987) 103 L Q Rev 433
at 444.
126. Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [30].
127. [1996] AC 669 at [704]–[716].
128. Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [32].
129. Eg the analysis of Mann J in In re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd [2008] BCC 22 at [39]–
[40].
130. Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] 1 WLR 3179 at [32].
131. Ibid, at [18]: ‘it is strictly speaking unnecessary to deal with the point’.
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principles to commercial dexterity – essentially, picking the explanation that supports
the desired outcome. While the Supreme Court loathes the remedial constructive trust,
it seems to practise a more disguised form of ‘discretionary remedialism’.
4. LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTIES
(a) Limitation
The ﬁnal category of cases that we shall consider here concerns the liability of third
parties or ‘strangers to the trust’.132 In England, the Supreme Court addressed some
key questions in respect of such claims inWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria,133 which
concerned an alleged sophisticated fraud on the claimant, whose claim was said by the
defendants to be out of time. Section 21 of the Limitation Act 1980, provides, so far as
relevant, that:
(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a
beneﬁciary under a trust, being an action
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party
or privy; or
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the
possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his
use.
…
(3) Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneﬁciary to
recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which
a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be
brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action
accrued.
By a majority (Lord Clarke dissenting on this point), the Court held that, both for
purposes of limitation, and more generally, dishonest assistants and knowing recipients
are not constructive trustees in a true sense. Rather, a stranger to the trust ‘is not in fact a
trustee at all, even though he may be liable to account as if he were’.134 Additionally
(Lord Mance dissenting on this point), in the particular context of s 21(1)(a), an ‘action
in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or
privy’, only refers to an action for breach of trust against the trustee (not to other actions
which might more broadly be said to be ‘in respect of’ a breach of trust, such as
dishonestly assisting a fraudulent trustee). This conclusion means that the 6-year
limitation period under s 21(3) applies to all claims against strangers to the trust,
although, peculiarly, in that section ‘in respect of any breach of trust’ does include such
132. ‘Strangers to the trust’ is of course shorthand, as liability may extend to conduct relating to
breaches of ﬁduciary (and other equitable) duties: Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2015] 2
WLR 526 at [92]; Westpac Banking Corp v Bell Group Ltd (No.3) (2012) 44 WAR 1 at
[2714]–[2733].
133. [2014] AC 1189. For fuller and more speciﬁc criticism, see J Lee ‘Constructing and
Limiting Liability in Equity’ (2015) 131 L Q Rev 39.
134. Paragon Finance Plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, per Millett LJ at 408–
409, endorsed by Lord Sumption in Williams at [9]–[11]. Williams was endorsed and applied
by Bell AJ in Atkinson v Berry [2014] NZHC 2318 at [27] (considering the then applicable s
21 of the NZ Limitation Act 1950). Cf the position in New South Wales: Sze Tu v Lowe
[2014] NSWCA 462 at [326]–[339], especially at [336]–[337].
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claims. It also means that the nature of the trustee’s breach does not affect whether a
limitation period applies.
Lord Sumption found support for his approach of limiting the exceptions to
limitation in the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in the Hong Kong case of Peconic
Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok Fai135 (although the dissenting Lord Mance
was notably critical of Lord Hoffmann’s approach).136 And indeed, it is must be
conceded that the approach of the Supreme Court is in line with other common law
jurisdictions. In Yong Kheng Leong v Panweld Trading Ltd,137 the Singapore Court
of Appeal considered a claim brought by a private company against one of its
directors in respect of alleged ﬁnancial irregularities, and against the director’s wife.
Although the court’s observations on limitation were strictly obiter,138 they are of
relevance here, as the material provisions of s 22 of the Singapore Limitation Act
replicate those of the 1980 Act. The Court held that the distinction between
constructive trustees (now endorsed in Williams) holds true for Singapore, and for
the law of limitation. The question is whether ‘the person holds property in the
position of a trustee … and deals with that property in breach of trust’.139 There
was no challenge to the conclusion that the 6-year limitation period applied to a claim
against the director’s wife for knowing receipt.
The decision inWilliams is less overtly based on commercialist reasoning than either
AIB or FHR, admittedly: however, we argue that it ﬁts the trend, not least in the light of
subsequent cases. In particular, as we examine through a comparative angle in the next
section, recent authorities from various common law jurisdictions on the liability of
strangers to the trust demonstrate reluctance on the part of the courts to subject such
parties (typically commercial actors who do not voluntarily undertake onerous
equitable obligations) to extensive liability.140 In particular, in addition to considering
Australian developments, our analysis compares English law with the developments in
other commercially focused common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and Hong
Kong. The convergence of judicial attitudes within the common law world strongly
indicates that English law is not alone in its commercialist treatment of equity.
(b) Standards for liability
Williams was the ﬁrst time in a decade that the Supreme Court (or House of Lords) had
substantively considered either ancillary liability in equity.141 The case was argued on
the basis, which the majorityWilliams accepted, that the principles as to establishing the
135. [2009] HKCFA 16.
136. Williams at [154].
137. [2013] 1 SLR 173.
138. As the Court dismissed the appeal on the challenge to the facts decided (and conceded
below): [2013] 1 SLR 173 at [34]–[35].
139. [2013] 1 SLR 173 at [46].
140. In Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Ltd [2015] UKSC 10, Lord Toulson, speaking of the
liability of a joint tortfeasor, noted (at [39]) that ‘In reality, the limitations which the courts have
placed upon the scope of liability as a joint tortfeasor are founded on a pragmatic concern to limit
the propensity of the law of tort to interfere with a person’s right to do things which are in
themselves entirely lawful.’ For further detail, see P Davies Accessory Liability (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2015) chs 4, 6.
141. Since Criterion Properties Plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28. There
had been some Privy Council decisions, such as Barlow Clowes International Ltd & Anor v
Eurotrust International Ltd (Isle of Man) [2005] UKPC 37 and Arthur v Attorney General of
the Turks & Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30.
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liability of strangers are largely settled, without interrogating some remaining
uncertainties that go to the nature of liability. As cases from the English Court of Appeal
and other jurisdictions show, other issues arising in the commercial context may well
require consideration at the highest level in England again soon.
We deal with dishonest assistance ﬁrst, and only brieﬂy, since the nature of the
liability is less controversial than that in knowing receipt. English law has had some
struggles with the test for dishonesty,142 but the law now appears to have settled on
an objective test.143 It has been clear in England since the Privy Council decision in
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan144 that there is no requirement for the trustee themselves
to be dishonest. In Australia, however, the High Court insisted that an action does
require there to have been knowing assistance in a dishonest and fraudulent design
on the part of the trustee or ﬁduciary.145 Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd,146 the New
South Wales Court of Appeal disapproved a Western Australian decision147 that had
been understood to have misinterpreted this criterion in so far as it related to the nature
of the breach of the primary duty. In Hasler, the court refused to lower the standard for
such claims in dishonest assistance: ‘It is plain (in Australia) that it is the quality of the
ﬁduciary’s breach which must answer the description of “dishonest or fraudulent”’.148
The effect of the Australian position is to conﬁne the potential for the liability of an
accessory (who does not procure or induce the breach) to those breaches which are
dishonest,149 and thus to make the action’s availability much more limited in
commercial litigation than it would be in England.
The reluctance to expose commercial actors to extensive equitable liability can also
be seen in Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk.150 A full account of the decision in that
case is beyond our scope here. But in the context of a claim in dishonest assistance
in respect of a complicated bribery scheme, the Court of Appeal insisted on a special
causation test that worked in favour of the defendant because he was not ‘a true
ﬁduciary’.151 The Court went on to state that ‘where a claim for an account of proﬁts
is made against one who is not a ﬁduciary, and does not owe ﬁduciary duties then …
the court has a discretion to grant or withhold the remedy’.152 The general approach
in Novoship has since been endorsed by the Board of the Privy Council.153 This
retention of discretion ﬁts with the trend we have seen for a measure of ﬂexibility in
142. J Lee ‘Fidelity in interpretation: Lord Hoffmann and The Adventure of the Empty House’
(2008) 28 Legal Stud 1.
143. Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash [2010] EWCACiv 1314, [25] (Sir AndrewMorritt C) and
Central Bank of Ecuador & Ors v Conticorp SA & Ors (Bahamas) [2015] UKPC 11 at [9] (Lord
Mance).
144. [1995] 2 AC 378.
145. Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (Farah) [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89, on
a strict interpretation of Lord Selborne LC in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 ChApp 244 at 251–252.
146. [2014] NSWCA 266.
147. Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157; 44 WAR 1.
148. Hasler [2014] NSWCA 266 at [110] (Leeming JA).
149. Ibid, at [125] (Leeming JA).
150. [2015] 2 WLR 526.
151. Ibid, at [115].
152. Ibid, at [119].
153. In Central Bank of Ecuador and others v Conticorp SA [2015] UKPC 11 (judgment on
interest and costs) at [9], speaking in the context of the discretion to award compound interest.
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judicial decision making in the commercial context, and is also applicable in knowing
receipt, to which we now turn.
The starting point for the modern English law on knowing receipt is Bank of Credit
and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele, which concerned a loan made
to the bank at a very generous rate of interest.154 TheCourt of Appeal determined that the
state of the recipient’s knowledge should be ‘such as to make it unconscionable for him
to retain the beneﬁt of the receipt’.155 Of particular note for present purposes is that
Nourse LJ expressly framed it within a commercial objective in mind:
A test in that form… should better enable the courts to give commonsense decisions
in the commercial context in which claims in knowing receipt are now frequently
made.156
In applying that test to the facts, the Nourse LJ held that the defendant Akindele, who
had no knowledge of underlying frauds at the bank, did not have the requisite
knowledge in all the circumstances: the defendant had viewed it ‘simply as an arm’s
length business transaction’.157
In Hong Kong, a key case in this thread is Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat v
Akai Holdings158 (featuring then Jonathan Sumption QC as counsel and Lord
Neuberger as judge). The case concerned the appropriate standard for judging whether
it was justiﬁable for a bank to have relied on an agent’s apparent authority to act in a
transaction. Lord Neuberger noted that ‘at least when it comes to normal commercial
transactions, the application of the concept of constructive notice, which is what Akai’s
approach effectively involves, has been deprecated’159 and that.
In a commercial context, absent dishonesty or irrationality, a person should be
entitled to rely on what he is told: this may occasionally produce harsh results, but
it enables people engaged in business to know where they stand.160
Later, his Lordship observed ‘how the law in this ﬁeld struggles to reconcile principle
and predictability with commercial reality and fairness’,161 and thus sought to avoid
laying down any rigid principles, in an echo of Nourse LJ in Akindele.162 Having
adopted that commercially friendly approach, Lord Neuberger held that the bank
nevertheless failed to establish that it had acted rationally, evaluating it in terms of
‘commercial common sense’ on the basis of both its own practice and that of Thai banks
more broadly.163 And, again, Lord Neuberger found that it was particularly important in
the commercial context that the common law test for reasonable reliance on apparent
authority of an alleged agent should be effectively identical to the equitable test for a
claim in knowing receipt:164
154. [2001] Ch 437.
155. Ibid, at 455.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid, at 457.
158. [2010] HKCU 2362.
159. Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat v Akai Holdings [2010] HKCU 2362 at [51].
160. Ibid, at [52].
161. Ibid, at [70].
162. Although it may be noted that Lord Neuberger left open the point as to whether
unconscionability as stated in Akindele is the correct approach in knowing receipt: Ibid, at [128].
163. Ibid, at [89].
164. Ibid, at [135].
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It makes little commercial sense, and would provide a fertile source of confusion and
inconsistency, if the tests were different … above all in a case involving knowing
receipt in an arm’s length commercial context, I consider that, at any rate absent very
special facts, equity would follow the law.165
An application of these explicitly commercial considerations can be seen in the
Singapore case of George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong.166 The Court of Appeal
drew upon both Akindele and Akai Holdings in addressing the consequences of a fraud
by a solicitor on two of his clients. The fraudulent solicitor had then bought jewellery
and precious stones from the defendant jewellery ﬁrm, buying in two batches – one
in respect of the majority of the items, and then a second payment which was via a cash
cheque identifying it as coming from a client account. That cheque was handed to a Mr
Ho, who was a director of the jewellery ﬁrm and an experienced businessman.
The clients sought to claim against the jeweller in both dishonest assistance and
knowing receipt. The action for dishonest assistance failed because the Court of Appeal
was not satisﬁed that the jeweller had assisted in the breach by passive receipt of funds
or that it was dishonest, though the latter ﬁnding was not properly explained.167 The
jeweller was held liable for knowing receipt of a portion of the proceeds. On knowing
receipt, the Court cautioned that:
courts should be very slow in imputing knowledge of wrongdoing when assessing
the propriety of commercial transactions. In the absence of established commercial
practices or obviously questionable conduct on the part of a counter-party, merchants
are not ordinarily expected to make searching inquiries into their customers’ source
of funds. To demand such diligence in the course of ordinary commercial
transactions would unduly constrict trading activities.168
In so holding, the Court delved into considerable detail on the nuances of the etiquette
of jewellery purchases, and luxury goods more broadly.169 This might be thought to be
‘commercialist’ reasoning on a relatively micro-scale,170 not least because the Court
stated that ‘real estate transactions that might involve lengthy investigations into title
and the existence of conﬂicting interests do not set normative standards in transactions
for the sale and purchase of goods’ (even ‘for very large purchases’).171
The Court went on to note that the subsequent receipt of a cash cheque labelled as
being from the ﬁrm’s client account did give rise to the requisite level of knowledge
to ‘a sophisticated businessman’ such as Mr Ho: ‘This was not, on the face of it, a
method of payment that a person with Ho’s background and experience could properly
regard as legitimate.’172 George Raymond Zage III v Ho Chi Kwong therefore
165. Ibid.
166. [2010] 2 SLR 589.
167. Ibid, at [43]. VK Rajah JA, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, merely
stressed that the knowledge requirement for both causes of action, though similar, remain
‘conceptually distinct’. There is a strong sense that the Court was careful not to label commercial
actors as ‘dishonest’, given the reputational repercussions. A similar, though separate concern
was found in Lord Hutton’s now disapproved combined test for dishonesty in the context of
the solicitor in Twinsectra Limited v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 at [35].
168. [2010] 2 SLR 589 at [52] (emphasis added).
169. [2010] 2 SLR 589 at [46].
170. The court noted (at [46]) the then absence of obligations in respect of money laundering
regulations in Singapore.
171. [2010] 2 SLR 589 at [46].
172. Ibid, at [50].
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demonstrates the very ﬂexibility in application of traditional principles of Equity
encouraged by Akindele and Akai Holdings. It also serves to highlight a further tension
in the courts’ reasoning.Akindele endorsed unconscionability as a supposedly objective,
yet ﬂexible standard (by virtue of its deliberate vagueness)173 that is applicable to
commercial contexts. And yet we ﬁnd that the courts still wish to retain the ability to
judge by a different, but still supposedly objective and ﬂexible standard in the form
commercial expectations or established practice for particular contexts.
In this area, the commercial paradigm174 perhaps explains the relative lack of judicial
interest in the case-law in the more nuanced arguments about the nature of claims in
knowing receipt, and whether it is, asMitchell andWatterson have argued, a distinctive,
primary, custodial liability’.175 Rather, it was sufﬁcient to decide in Williams, for
example, that knowing recipients are not trustees, reinforcing the independence of
the wrong from the (decided to be) ﬁctive language of trusteeship.176 Williams thus
establishes the clear dividing line for commercial actors to be able to avail themselves
of the limitation period, even if the interpretation is decidedly awkward.177 The
authorities considered in this section are thus in line with the trend which we have seen
AIB, FHR and even Bailey.
CONCLUSIONS
Lord Browne-Wilkinson famously cautioned against ‘the wholesale importation into
commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent with the certainty and speed which
are essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business affairs’.178 Our argument
has shown that recent jurisprudence suggests that care should be taken in the opposite
direction too. We have seen that the inﬂuence and impact of commercial (and Scots)
rather than Chancery lawyers in part explains the revisionist creativity on display.
The framing of issues is important: Lord Sumption, for example, began his judgment
in Bailey – a case which, as we have seen, raised important questions about the law
of constructive trusts – by stating that the appeal raised ‘two important and controversial
questions of commercial law’.179
It is important to be clear that the target of our criticism here is verymuch the tone and
structure of the reasoning in the key authorities: it is perfectly possible to agree with the
173. As to which, see G Virgo ‘Whose conscience? Unconscionability in the common law of
obligations’ in A Robertson and M Tilbury (eds) Divergences in Private Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2016) p 293.
174. Lord Walker ‘Dishonesty and unconscionable conduct in commercial life – some
reﬂections on accessory liability and knowing receipt’ (2005) 27 Sydney L Rev 187.
175. C Mitchell and S Watterson ‘Remedies for knowing receipt’ in C Mitchell (ed)
Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) p 129. This was supported
by Sir Terence Etherton in the Privy Council decision of Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks
& Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30 at [37]. Sir Terence has served as Chancellor and was recently
appointed to succeed Lord Dyson asMaster of the Rolls (returning a Chancery lawyer to the role).
Cf D Whayman ‘Remodelling knowing receipt as a gains-based wrong’ [2016] J Bus L 565.
176. See J Glister and J Lee Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
20th edn, London, 2015) para 25–004.
177. Lee, above n 133, at 42–43.
178. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC
669 at 704G–705B. Cf also Reynolds, above n 21, pp 704–705.
179. [2016] UKSC 47 at [1] (emphasis added).
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outcome of any one of these cases without signing up to the route by which the court
arrived at the conclusion. Nor is our argument that commercial considerations should
be irrelevant to adjudication. Diversity of views can enrich the court’s reasoning. As
More noted in Utopia:
You are not obliged to assault people with discourses that are out of their road, when
you see that their received notions must prevent your making an impression upon
them: you ought rather to cast about and to manage things with all the dexterity in
your power, so that, if you are not able to make them go well, they may be as little
ill as possible; for, except all men were good, everything cannot be right, and that
is a blessing that I do not at present hope to see.180
Our concern is, rather, with the demonstrable pattern in the cases of either
subjugating the received notions of equity to commercial dexterity, or declining to
engage with principle in the ﬁrst place. Nor are appeals to commercial considerations
always objectively ascertainable or veriﬁable. This commercialist ﬂexibility comes at
the expense of doctrinal coherence and a lack of development of equitable principles.
Equity is being assaulted by commercialist discourse.
Our principal focus has been on the UK Supreme Court, and we have argued that the
next two rounds of appointments of Justices must recognise the need for Chancery
experience, and the balance of specialist and generalist expertise. Importantly, there
should not be any assumption that commercial experience is neutrally ‘generalist’.
Yet we have further shown that the ‘commercialisation’ of equity is not, however, a
purely national revolution. And our argument has broader horizons, especially when
one turns to examine the developments in jurisdictions that pride themselves as
commercial hubs. In Hong Kong, there is a cross-pollination of the law from the judges
in England and Australia sitting in the Court of Final Appeal: the inﬂuence of these
judges is notable in commercial/Chancery cases.181 A wider, related issue is the extent
to which the law, and the courts, in the various jurisdictions considered above are, and
should be, sensitive to reﬂecting commercial reality and good sense, as a facet of being
an attractive centre for the adjudication of international commercial litigation.182 For
example, Singapore’s goal of developing its own indigenous law contrasts with the rise
of the Singapore International Commercial Court183 (which is part of the initiative to
internationalise the local legal sector): disputes before the latter will usually be presided
over by international judges. It remains to be determined the extent to which cases
before the Singapore International Commercial Court will inﬂuence the development
180. T More Utopia, tr G Burnet (London, 1808) p 56.
181. Of cases mentioned here, see eg Lord Hoffmann NPJ in Peconic Industrial Development
Ltd v Lau Kwok Fai [2009] HKCFA 16, Lord Neuberger NPJ in Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai
Chamkat (Mahachon) (aka Kasikornbank Public Co Ltd) v Akai Holdings Ltd (in liquidation)
[2012] HKCU 2362, and Lord Millett NPJ in Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall [2014] 1
HKC 369.
182. See further the Honourable the Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Keynote Address at
Singapore Academy of Law and Chancery Bar Conference 2013 ‘Finance, property and business
litigation in a changing world’, speech, Singapore, 25 April 2013.
183. See M Yip ‘The resolution of disputes before the Singapore International Commercial
Court’ (2016) 65 Int’l Comp L Q 439.
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of Singapore law, but our analysis suggests that caution is needed.184 Throughout this
paper, we have used ‘commercialisation’ and ‘commercialised’ as shorthand for
commercial considerations, and perhaps the considerations of commercial lawyers
inﬂuencing reasoning in equity here.185 But we have also used it advisedly, with the
implicit undertone of the potential commodiﬁcation of law, in England and elsewhere.
At the heart of the debate concerning the modern development of equity, then, lies the
important query of what the law of trusts is meant to do, and to be. After this dystopian
revolution, a restoration of principle is needed. But such a restoration requires us to
consider more deeply what are the old ways of equity that no longer suit the modern
world, and which, if any, must be abandoned.
184. See eg CPIT Investments Ltd v Qilin World Capital Ltd [2016] SGHC(I), in which Vivian
Ramsay International Judge delivered a decision on Singapore civil procedure, in relation to
applications made in respect of a case that has been transferred to the Singapore International
Commercial Court.
185. Lord Sumption has noted that ‘there is greater ﬂexibility [in] the legal profession. The
division between the chancery bar and the common law bar, which was once absolute, has
become almost imperceptible’: Sumption, above n 34, at 6.
The commercialisation of equity 25
© 2017 The Society of Legal Scholars
